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A profoundly important development in international legal scholarship has been a ‘turn 
to history’ which has questioned standard narratives, confronted problematic legacies, 
and recovered forgotten visions.1 Far from being a passing curiosity, the critical 
engagement with the origins of the international legal order has become more 
sophisticated over the past two decades and has shown no signs of slowing down. For 
proponents of this meta-project, and those participating in the discussion Jennifer Pitts’s 
Boundaries of the International: Law and Empire (hereinafter ‘Boundaries’) provides 
an invaluable contribution to the debate. Nuanced in its analysis, accessible in its prose, 
and riveting in its narrative, Boundaries2 is strongly recommended both for experts and 
for beginners interested in how histories of empires founded upon juridical inequality 
are vital in understanding the contemporary international legal order, ostensibly 
founded upon formally equal sovereign states.   
A key aspect of Boundaries is that Pitts tells the story of international law as a 
political scientist specialising in the history of empire and political thought, rather than 
a scholar with an internal perspective emanating from within the field of international 
law. Thus, instead of exclusively focusing on publicists who are considered to be 
authoritative legal sources, Pitts analyses such figures as Emer de Vattel, Frederik von 
Martens, Henry Wheaton, Travers Twiss, and John Westlake, alongside other 
contributors to the law and empire debates. This group consists of some of the most 
canonical figures in Western political thought, including but not limited to 
Montesquieu, Edmund Burke, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, who are rarely 
considered by international lawyers despite their prominence elsewhere. This cast is 
joined by figures who are largely forgotten today but who were highly important in 
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their own times including: the orientalist Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron; the 
admiralty judge William Scott, Lord Stowell; the jurist and parliamentarian Sir James 
Mackintosh; and the historian, Muslim convert, and critic of empire Henry EJ Stanley. 
As such, Boundaries is formidable in its comprehensive contextualising of modern 
international legal thought above and beyond orthodox narratives. 
Moreover, Boundaries is a welcome intervention in the ongoing methodological 
debate between intellectual historians and critical international lawyers over the 
meaning of international law’s European and exclusionist origins. While the former 
have sought to avoid anachronism through highly contextualised readings of the field’s 
canonical publicists and the limited intellectual resources available to them, the latter 
have emphasised the inherently anachronistic ways in which law (especially the 
common law tradition) links otherwise unrelated events as a means of articulating 
allegedly timeless principles.3 As such, while intellectual historians are generally 
sceptical of directly associating early modern thinkers with present global inequalities, 
critical international lawyers, namely those belonging to the Third World Approaches 
to International Law movement, often view this link as an essential starting point for 
analysis.4 In light of this debate, Pitts offers an effective (if less than explicit) synthesis 
of both positions through a rich contextual history that is cognisant of how legal ideas 
bear consequences which extend far beyond the lifetime of formative theorists. In doing 
so, the author avoids judging historical actors against contemporary normative 
standards, at the same time as showing how the chauvinist pronouncements of those 
same historical actors may still be found within today’s political discourse on 
international inequality. 
Directly connected to its methodological strengths, Boundaries is also highly 
innovative in its choice of subject matter. Here, Pitts notes how accounts of 
international law’s imperial origins tend to either focus on sixteenth and seventeenth-
century figures such as Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius or on the field’s 
disciplinary and institutional expansion in the late-nineteenth/early-twentieth centuries. 
As such, she helps to fill an important gap in the literature by focusing primarily on 
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eighteenth and early-nineteenth century developments. While this period is generally 
viewed as marking the transition between an universalistic natural law tradition and a 
more limited, yet predictable, legal positivism tradition (the shift being either a good or 
bad development depending on one’s conception of law), Boundaries deeply 
complicates this account. According to Pitts, this era witnessed the rise of critical legal 
universalisms that condemned practices of colonialism, which were justified through 
earlier natural law discourses of ‘barbarism’/‘savagery’, and called for the greater 
inclusions of non-European peoples and traditions. However, these positive 
developments failed to survive a parochial nineteenth-century process of disciplinary 
consolidation. Under the dubious label of ‘positivism’, complete international 
subjectivity was consigned to a ‘Christian’, ‘European’/ and ‘civilised’ ‘family of 
nations’, which in turn legitimised the domination of those which it excluded. By and 
large, Boundaries is the story of the rise and fall of lost international legal visions that 
were far more open and inclusive than anything that existed before or since. 
In Chapter I, Pitts provides a comprehensive overview of recent critical 
developments in international law, history, and international relations as a means of 
setting the stage for five chapters detailing multifaceted intellectual engagements with 
questions of law and empire. A key figure here is the Polish jurist CH Alexandrowicz 
whose writings in the 1950s-70s emphasised the historic equality of European and non-
European nations that was denigrated by nineteenth-century colonialism, but which was 
revived with twentieth-century decolonisation. While Pitts is clear that 
Alexandrowicz’s portrayal of inter-cultural equality is not entirely accurate (discourses 
of legal inequality did in fact pre-date nineteenth century colonialism), there is still 
value in revisiting his work as a critique of the idea that international law is inherently 
a tool of domination.  
Chapter II details characterisations of the Ottoman Empire as a lawless ‘other’ 
to the emerging European states-system. However, these narratives of ‘oriental 
despotism’ were challenged in various ways by sympathetic Europeans with personal 
experiences in the non-European world. These included Sir James Porter’s invocation 
of legal diversity as a critique of Ottoman ‘lawlessness’ and Anquetil’s focus on the 
self-serving interests of European profiteers which motivated exclusionary legal 
discourses as normative justifications. Chapter III then turns to the influence of the 
Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel and his 1758 treatise The Law of Nations. While Vattel has 
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long been associated with the transition from natural law universalism to the morally 
agnostic tolerance of ideological diversity, Pitts shows how Vattel should be understood 
not as a ‘proto-positivist’, but as a natural lawyer whose normative emphasis on 
pluralism made the defence of small states (including Vattel’s native Swiss Canton of 
Neuchâtel) a matter of universal moral obligation. Yet despite this universalistic 
championing of the marginalised, Vattel was nonetheless predominantly focused on 
Europe and was quite hostile in his characterisation of non-European--especially 
Muslim--societies. 
Chapter IV explores the late-eighteenth century heyday of critical legal 
inclusion through the efforts of Edmund Burke and William Scott, Lord Stowell, which 
centred on the former’s condemnation of the cruelty of the British East India Company 
against local populations and the latter’s admiralty court decisions involving non-
European parties. Unlike later nineteenth-century publicists who considered European 
customs and practices to be the exclusive sources of the law of nations, Burke and Scott 
maintained a far more critical perspective on legal universalism in this capacity. For 
these thinkers, the universal law of nations did not prioritise the West and actively 
recognised non-European practices, concepts, and traditions relating to public order and 
governmental authority as sources of law that were just as valid as anything created by 
Europeans. While one should not overly romanticize these figures, especially Burke 
(whose Indo-European equality scheme was scarcely applicable to indigenous 
communities in Africa or the Americas), they nonetheless represented the possibility of 
hybrid juridical synthesis in the formation of a legal regime that is more reflective of 
the world’s cultural diversity.  
In explaining the loss of these inclusionary opportunities, Chapter V shifts to 
the early-nineteenth century, where Vattel’s authoritative status was challenged by a 
historicist critique of the timeless universalism of the natural law. While Robert Ward, 
the first scholar to adopt such an approach, embodied the non-chauvinist ethos of 
eighteenth-century critical universalism, this was quickly undone by James Mackintosh 
who used historicist legal theory to proclaim European superiority. This new 
exclusionist historicism was deployed against attempts by non-Western actors, 
including Hamdan Khoja in Algiers and Lin Zexu in China, who invoked the 
universalist ethos of European legal treatises (namely Vattel’s) to critique Western 
imperialists as violators of their own ideals regarding the equality of nations.  
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Finally, Chapter VI shows how this early nineteenth-century discourse of 
Eurocentric legal historicism became hegemonic in the latter half of this century. 
Centring on Victorian Britain, Pitts describes the dominant sensibility as one where:  
…the European law of nations was a global legal system in embryo, other 
nations were lawless in so far as they failed to participate in the European 
system, and…a key task of European jurists was to construct a process by which 
these others might be granted admission to the European global legal 
community.5 
In detailing the triumph of this sensibility, Boundaries shows how these exclusionary 
presumptions informed the consolidation of international law as a field during this era. 
Here, despite the availability of inclusive formulations of the law of nations, the writers 
of authoritative treatises invested in distilling international law into a ‘science’ were 
deeply self-limiting in their selection of sources owing to a normative goal of centring 
Europe as the sole source of law-based progress. In concluding, Pitts offers broad 
reflections as to how the contemporary global order may be reconceptualised in light of 
these histories. 
While Boundaries is highly extensive in the number of issues and thinkers that 
it covers, the selection represents only a small portion of the possible engagements 
within an era long neglected by international legal scholars. Given the limitation of the 
book’s scope to Anglophone and Francophone figures, one is left to wonder in what 
ways did other European actors contribute to these debates.6 This is to say nothing of 
how figures from beyond Europe can be incorporated into this body of narratives, 
especially given that Pitts’s engagement with Khoja and Lin are some of Boundaries’ 
most interesting observations. Recourse to intellectual hybridity as a tactic of resistance 
amongst colonised subjects has a long history and there remains much work to be done 
in accounting for the international legal dimensions of such practices.7 Furthermore, 
Boundaries is largely (if not exclusively) concerned with legal relations between 
European and Asian empires to the exclusion of the Americas and Africa. While Pitts 
mentions Vattel’s influence in this context, the narrative leaves out a number of 
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important legal questions generated by new states in the Americas under a diverse array 
of circumstances in the period. 
However, if there is one omission in Boundaries that can genuinely be described 
as a missed opportunity, it is the exclusive focus on British jurists in Chapter VI. While 
Pitts justifies this limited focus by invoking the greater political and legal influence of 
Britain as the world’s foremost imperial power, a greater inclusion of late-nineteenth 
century Francophone theorists (and critics) of empire would have been a helpful 
addition. Such a comparative engagement would have been consistent with both the 
overall thrust of Boundaries and Pitts’s earlier work on the evolution of liberal 
justifications for empire in British and French thought.8 Moreover, it would have been 
a unique space for introducing otherwise lesser-known French-speaking thinkers to an 
English-speaking readership.  
Nevertheless, given the scope of this work, this is a minor issue, especially 
considering the methodological contribution it provides to critical and history-oriented 
scholars of international law. As it currently stands, scholars working in these fields 
often find themselves in a dilemma in which reliance on traditional sources (namely the 
work of canonical publicists) reproduces Eurocentric presumptions, and yet expanding 
beyond these sources risks undermining the ‘legal’ character and credibility of one’s 
intellectual output.9 Yet, in reading Boundaries, this methodological struggle inspires 
hope as opposed to anxiety. Such optimism stems from the fact that international law’s 
‘current historicizing moment’10 can be understood, at least partially, as a welcome 
revival of eighteenth-century visions of critical legal inclusion across diverse societies. 
According to Pitts: ‘This may make possible something like a return to the 
predisciplinary status of the law of nations as discourse available to a wider array of 
writers, thinkers, and publics’.11 Thus, rather than simply being disruptive agitators in 
the face of international legal progress, those who question disciplinary rigidity, or even 
disciplinary virtue, belong to a proud intellectual tradition.  
However, while the prospective recovery of this earlier eighteenth-century 
tradition invokes the idea of progressively reinventing contemporary international law, 
Boundaries can also be read as calling attention to deeper questions surrounding the 
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very discourse of ‘progress’ in relation to international law. As Pitts has shown, the 
nineteenth-century re-tooling of international law in the service of colonialism was 
itself justified in the name of ‘progress’ both for the discipline and the world as a whole. 
What then should transformation-seeking international lawyers do in light of their 
field’s long history of producing well-intended progress narratives able to justify 
exclusion and domination? Asking these questions is of paramount importance given 
the ubiquity of often uncritical ‘progress’ discourses in the doctrines, institutions, and 
mainstream culture of international law in its current form.12 While there may not be 
any simple answers here, through its historically-grounded call for far less linearity and 
far more inclusion in our conceptualisation of these questions, Boundaries provides an 
indispensable resource for those seeking to account for international law’s place in our 
imagination of the world and its possible futures.   
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